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In this paper we examine the institutional real estate ownership patterns of 
life insurance companies for 10 countries over the period 1986-96.  The 
countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
We find that most institutional investors worldwide have shifted out of real 
estate assets and into stocks and bonds over the last decade.  We then 
investigate whether this behavior is the result of changing investor 
perceptions or a shift in stock market capitalization.  To test this hypothesis, 
the paper derives measures of ex ante real estate returns following 
previous empirical work in finance.  The results indicate that only a small 
proportion of what is driving institutional investors' real estate portfolio 
decisions is actually explained by changing investor perceptions and 




Institutions, International Investment, Portfolio Diversification. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
For institutional investors, the rationale for real estate investing is not hard to 
discern.  By and large, real estate returns are not highly correlated with other 
assets typically found in portfolios, such as stocks, bonds and money market 18  Chun and Shilling 
instruments.  This tells us that real estate tends to expand the opportunity set 
of total investing.  Consequently, when real estate is left out of the portfolio, 
more risk than necessary is assumed, perhaps with a penalty to returns as 
well.  In fact, if institutional investors care only about the mean and variance 
of the return on their invested wealth, one would expect these investors, as a 
first approximation, to hold the market portfolio of stocks, bonds, and real 
estate.  Also, if there are no serial correlations in market returns, and if asset 
risks and correlations seldom change, then one would expect most 
institutional investors to hold a particular optimum mix of assets in their 
portfolios and to attempt to maintain these proportions in the face of changes 
in market values.  Yet the available data would seem to indicate that since the 
mid-1980s there has been a substantial change in the portfolio composition of 
most institutional investors worldwide.  The direction of this change has 
fairly consistently been from holding a mixed portfolio of stocks, bonds, and 
real estate to holding a mixed portfolio of stocks and bonds with very limited 
investments in real estate assets.  The exceptions to this rule, however, are 
important, and we shall refer to their significance a little later. 
 
Inevitably, the question that arises is "why?"  Why has this change 
occurred?  What are the economic forces that have determined its extent and 
direction?  One general concern is that the great bear market in real estate, 
which began both in the U.S. and abroad in the late 1980s and continued into 
the early 1990s, has dramatically changed the way in which most institutional 
investors view real estate.  An alternative concern is that institutional 
investors have made a switch from real estate to stocks and bonds because 
current economic conditions are more favorable to stocks and bonds than to 
real estate.  Moreover, there is some concern that most institutional investors 
are dominated by a short-run trading mentality, and that they are quick to 
dump any investment that they believe might have a short-term downward 
price movement, regardless of its long-term prospects.  This situation can 
arise not only for reasons having to do with noisy rational expectations, but 
also as a result of such factors as the existence of deadweight costs.
 1 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between real estate portfolio weights 
and net asset yields by focusing on the expected annual returns on real estate 
                                                                 
1Although not studying the lack of real estate diversification, Gehrig (1993), Low 
(1993), Brennan and Cao (1994), and Zhou (1994) provide a dynamic noisy rational 
expectations model where some investors know more about one asset and others 
know more about another asset.  These types of models help explain why some 
investors look like they are insufficiently diversified.  Stulz (1981) argues that some 
securities may not be held by investors because of deadweight costs (e.g., a cost 
associated with holding). 
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needed to rationalize observed portfolio holdings.  We also employ the 
approximate accounting identity of Campbell (1987, 1991) to estimate the 
relationship between ex post real estate returns and ex ante future real estate 
excess (over risk-free rates) returns.  A lesson to be learned from this study is 
that, when times are good for stocks (relative to real estate), as they have 
been in most countries in recent years, most institutional investors appear to 
be very reluctant to rebalance their portfolios.  By design, then, real estate 
asset allocations will fall.  Real estate markets can also go through a 
prolonged crash, as in the United States during the late eighties and early 
nineties.  This, too, can lead to reduced real estate asset allocations.
2  
 
We also observe in this paper a negative correlation between real estate asset 
allocations and lagged real estate unexpected excess returns.  These results 
confirm findings in the literature that risk-neutral investors should be less 
inclined to invest in an asset after an unexpected increase in the asset's 
excess return because this price increase could be due to a possible 
downward adjustment of future expected returns.  Further research should 
investigate conditions under which models of institutional investor behavior 
could explain both the level and the cross-sectional variation in real estate 
ownership documented here.  We also recognize that substantial research 
remains to be done to further our understanding of cross-country differences 
in institutional real estate ownership patterns, particularly among Asian 
countries.  Our sample, dictated by data availability, excludes Asian 
institutional investors.  
 
2.  Institutional Real Estate Ownership Patterns 
 
This section examines institutional real estate ownership patterns of life 
insurance companies for 10 countries over the period 1986-96.  The countries 
included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States; together they account 
for about two-thirds of invested assets of insurance companies worldwide.  
All our data on real estate ownership patterns for non-U.S. countries are from 
Datastream.  The real estate ownership data for the United States come from 
Life Insurance Fact Book.  We consider the data chosen to be the best 
available, but such data must be used with care.  
                                                                 
 2 These conclusions suggest that institutional investors, on the one hand, invest on 
the basis of rational forecasts of future returns, holding a higher fraction of stocks 
when expected returns on stocks are high, and, on the other hand, they invest on the 
basis of perceived fundamentals, holding a small fraction of real estate assets when 
perceived returns on real estate are low. 
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Table 1 and Figure 1a-1h present summary data on country-by-country 
institutional real estate portfolio holdings (value-weighted) over the period 
1986-96.  As our measure of asset allocation to real estate, we use the 
reported proportion of total life insurance company assets invested in real 
estate, either directly or indirectly through commingled funds. A priori, we 
might expect institutional investors to invest between 15 to 20% of their 
assets (or higher) in real estate (see Firstenberg, Ross, and Zisler (1988), 
Fogler (1984), Hartzell, Heckman, and Miles (1986), Ibbotson and Siegel 
(1984), Miles and McCue (1984), and most recently LaSalle Advisors (1997)).  
The data show, however, that there are few institutional investors which are 
even roughly in accord with what the portfolio theory would predict. 
 
Table 1 Institutional Real Estate Portfolio Holdings 
     Selected Years     Sub-intervals   
  1988  1996  1986-96  1986-91  1992-96 
United States       0.0815  0.0259  0.0590  0.0752  0.0346 
United Kingdom   0.1722  0.0723  0.1283  0.1650  0.0842 
Sweden               -  0.0481  0.0766  0.0886  0.0742 
Austria                0.1437  0.0986  0.1096  0.1130  0.1069 
Netherlands         0.0720  0.0500  0.0665  0.0707  0.0623 
Italy                  -  0.1457  0.1684  0.1770  0.1632 
France                0.0602  0.1232  0.0895  0.0696  0.1054 
Spain  0.2881  0.1658  0.2407  0.2594  0.2257 
Belgium               0.0639  0.0457  0.0674  0.0745  0.0617 
Australia             0.0000  0.0695  0.0356  0.0000  0.0640 
Mean   0.0871  0.0469  0.0728  0.0836  0.0546 
Note : All our data on real estate ownership by non-U.S. life insurance companies are 
from Datastream.  The real estate ownership data for the United States come 
from 1996 Life Insurance Fact Book.   
 
The data also show that, even though real estate fundamentals have been 
improving worldwide, the holdings of real estate by most institutional 
investors have dropped sharply as a percentage of portfolio assets over time.  
U.S. institutional investors, for example, have gone from holding 
approximately 8% of their portfolio in real estate in 1986 to less than 2.5% 
today. 
 
A roughly similar pattern is found in the U.K.  U.K. institutional investors, 
which held more than 16% of their assets in real estate during the period 1986-
91, today hold approximately 7¼% of their assets in real estate.  Dutch 
investors have reduced their holdings of real estate assets from approximately 
7% of total portfolio assets in the period 1986-91 to about 5% today.   
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There is also evidence that institutional investors in Austria, Belgium, Italy, 
Spain, and Sweden have significantly reduced their relative portfolio shares in 
real estate.  To a great extent this decline follows the real estate cycle in each 
country, but this is not a complete explanation, for there has been a rise in real 
estate activity in many of these countries, especially during the latter 1990s. 
 
In France the numbers exhibit a slightly different pattern.  French institutional 
investors have gone from holding approximately 7% of their invested assets 
in real estate during the period 1986-91 to having over 12% of their assets 
invested in real estate in 1996.  As for Australia, the data at hand show that 
investment in real estate is a recent phenomenon (at least for the Australian 
institutional investors included in our sample).
3   For instance, over the period 
1986-91, when institutional investors worldwide held about 8% of their assets 
                                                                 
 3 We do not wish to push these data too far.  As noted below, the data are open to 
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in real estate, Australian institutional investors were typically not invested in 
real estate.  In 1993, by comparison, Australian institutional investors held 
about 9% of their assets in real estate.  This ratio has since declined to less 
than 7% today. 
 
Finally, we should point out that the countries can be ranked in the following 
order, starting with those with the heaviest portfolio shares invested in real 
estate in 1996: Spain, Italy, France, Austria, U.K., Australia, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Belgium, and the U.S.  This ranking is partly explained by the fact 
that European institutional investors on average are noticeably larger (in 
terms of asset size) than their U.S. counterparts.   
 
Theoretically, one could argue that small institutional investors are likely to 
have relatively high costs per dollar of direct investment outlay.  As a result, 
they are unlikely to find real estate an attractive investment.  On the other 
hand, and again from a theoretical standpoint, large-scale institutional 
investors should be able to amortize these costs over a relatively large direct 
investment outlay.  Thus, one would expect most large-scale institutional 
investors to own more real estate assets (as a percent of total wealth), 
especially since real estate in a typical common stocks and bonds portfolio 
may reduce  the portfolio's risk without penalizing returns.  Ciochetti, Sa-
Aadu, and Shilling (1997) confirm the existence of a significant size effect for 
institutional investors. 
 
3.  Constructing Real Estate Expected Returns 
 
There are several different approaches which may be used to measure ex ante 
real estate returns.  Here we choose to follow two distinct approaches: the 
French-Poterba (1991) CAPM approach, and the Campbell (1987, 1991) 
approximation to the present-value model.   
 
3.1  French-Poterba CAPM Approach 
 
The French-Poterba methodology makes use of the Sharpe-Litner capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM).  As Merton (1973) and others have shown, the 
Sharpe-Litner capital asset pricing model implies the following asset pricing: 
 
 
) 1 ( ) ( 1 S ¢ = - + w R R E
f
t t t l  
 
where R t+1  is a vector of mean returns, R
tReal Estate Asset Allocation  25 
f
  is the risk-free rate, l is the aggregate index of relative risk aversion in each 
country, w' is the transpose of a set of portfolio weights w, S is a covariance 
matrix, and E t is the conditional expectations operator, conditional on 
information available at time t.   
 
Here (1) can be used either to determine the optimal portfolio weights, w*, 
given the vector of mean excess returns, E t(Rt+1) - Rt
f, or to infer the expected 
excess returns, E t(R
*
t+1) - Rt
f , implied by w.  We choose to follow the latter 
approach. 
  
In implementing this approach, we examine annual returns on common stocks, 
bonds, and real estate in each of our 10 countries from 1986 to 1996.  All 
returns are expressed in local currency (i.e., without the effects of foreign 
exchange translation).  Data sources used in the various rates of return 
calculations include: Ibbotson's SBBI Yearbook and NAREIT Handbook for 
U.S. returns, and Datastream for non-U.S. returns.  The real estate returns are 
for the property-stock sector.  Firms in this sector are engaged primarily in the 
development and management of commercial real estate.  Average market 
capitalization for these companies exceeds US$100 million, which implies a 
reasonable degree of liquidity (which is important for the analysis that 
follows).  Among the property companies included are Lend Lease 
Corporation (Australia); Unibail (France); Aedes and Immobiliare Metanopoli 
(Italy); Rodamco (Netherlands); Metovacesa and Vallehermoso (Spain); 
Hammerson and MEPC (United Kingdom); and Equity Residential, New Plan 
Realty Trust, and Weingarten Realty (United States).  The bond market 
returns are for long-term (10-years or longer) government bonds. 
 
We use these returns data to construct a number of variables, which we now 
describe.  An important variable in our model is the covariance matrix, S, 
which is o ur measure of the diversification benefits of real estate.  The 
modeling approach taken here is to make a reasonable estimate of S  for each 
country.  A number of difficulties are inherent in this approach, of which 
researchers familiar with these issues are well aware. Firstly, there is the 
disadvantage of working with subindexes.  Secondly, property-stock sector 
returns and volatilities vary widely across countries.  Thirdly, some of these 
differences result from differences  in the amount of leverage used and 
whether stocks of active developers-owners or passive holding companies 
predominate the country-specific property-stock sector index.  Nevertheless, 
by making a separate estimate of S for each country, the results should 
reflect the fundamentals of the countries' underlying property markets, 
although direct property investments' returns and volatilities may be different, 
a point that we will refer to later. 26  Chun and Shilling 
 
Although we do not reproduce the results here, in calculating S along the 
lines suggested above, we find, first of all, that most property-stock sector 
returns are significantly positively correlated with stock market returns at the 
0.01 level.  We also see that most property-stock sector returns are 
significantly positively correlated with real estate returns at the 0.01 level.  Of 
course, neither of these results is surprising, since many broad factors affect 
all three: stock market returns, property-stock returns, and real estate returns.
4 
 
In Panel A of Table 2, we show the expected real estate returns needed to 
justify the observed portfolio weights in each of our 10 countries.  The 
procedure outlined above allows us to obtain yearly expected returns for the 
period 1986-1996.  Rather than reproduce these returns for each year, we 
aggregate them by country for the whole sample period and then for two 
subsamples.  To obtain Et(R
*








Panel B of Table 2 shows that substantial differences in expected real estate 
returns for institutional investors in a given nation are needed over time and 
across countries to rationalize observed portfolio holdings.  These 
differences suggest that institutional investors in Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States currently are quite pessimistic about their 
real estate markets.  For example, in the U.S. case, institutional investors 




Table 2 : Expected Real Estate Returns and Return Deviations 
Panel A.  Expected Real Estate Returns Needed to Justify the Observed 
Portfolio Weights (in local currency) 
                                                                 
4 Gyourko and Keim (1992) stress this.  See also Zeckhauser and Silverman (1983):  
stressing the role that corporate real estate plays in the value of the firm.  This 
suggests that at least part of the variance in stock returns should be related to changes 
in the value of corporate-owned land and structures. 
 
5 We use the following proxies as the risk-free rates: 3-month treasury bill rates for 
Australia, Belgium, and Sweden; 3-month interbank loan rates for Spain and France; a 
bank discount rate for Italy; a 1-month interbank rate for the Netherlands; a 3-month 
VIBOR rate for Austria; and 1-month treasury rates for the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  During the 1986-95 period, these returns ranged from 6.36% (Austria) 
to 25.73% (Spain).  
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      87-96    87-91    92-96   
 
United States    0.0918    0.1044    0.0791 
United Kingdom    0.1846    0.2185    0.1506 
Sweden      0.2410        -    0.2304 
Austria      0.0636    0.0659    0.0604 
Netherlands    0.1239    0.1271    0.1203 
Italy      0.1630    0.1775    0.1452 
France      0.1797    0.1596    0.1881 
Spain      0.2573    0.2734    0.2373 
Belgium     0.1269    0.1339    0.1207 
Australia    0.1652    0.1938    0.1344 
Mean (Value-Weighted)  0.1184    0.1234    0.1063 
 
Panel B.  Deviation Between Expected Real Estate Returns and Actual 
Real Estate Returns (in local currency) 
       87-96     87-91     92-96 
 
United States     -0.0101      0.0711    -0.0913 
United Kingdom      0.0334      0.1226    -0.0558 
Sweden         0.0984         -    -0.0984 
Austria        0.0307         -     0.0307 
Netherlands      0.0868      0.1221     0.0586 
Italy        0.2147      0.1333     0.2473 
France        0.1607     -0.0598     0.2929 
Spain        0.1995      0.3441     0.1126 
Belgium       0.0628      0.1025     0.0469 
Australia     -0.0302     -0.0271    -0.0320 
Mean (Value-Weighted)    0.0229      0.0636    -0.0306 
Note : The expected returns are calculated by adding the expected excess returns 
derived from the CAPM to the risk-free rates.  The following risk-free rates are 
used: 3 -months treasury bill rates for Australia, Belgium, and Sweden; 3-
months interbank loans rates for Spain and France; a discount rate for Italy; a 
1-month interbank rate for the Netherlands; a 3-month VIBOR rate for Austria; 
and 1-month treasury bill rates for the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
From Panel A, we see that U.S. investors are expecting to earn at best a rate of 
return that is in the 8% range.  Yet, current returns are in the 17% range, 
suggesting an implied difference of -900 basis points (expected minus actual) 
as shown in panel B.  For U.K. institutional investors, the current annual 
expected return on real estate is in the 15% range, while current returns are in 
the 20½% range, an implied difference of  -550 basis points.  A similar 
interpretation holds for institutional investors in Australia; although, the 
numbers are not quite as dramatic. 
 
Those institutional investors currently most optimistic (taking into account 28  Chun and Shilling 
current actual returns) are the French and the Italians.  The data in panel A of 
Table 2 show that these investors currently expect real estate returns to be in 
the 14 to 19% range, while actual returns on real estate are quite negative.  
The Swedes and the Spaniards are also quite optimistic about their real estate 
markets.  Both expect real estate returns to be in the 23% range.  In 
comparison, actual real estate returns in Sweden and Spain currently are in 
the 13% range. 
 
We next compare our cross-sectional estimates for the period 1987-91 with 
those for the period 1992-96 to see if there were substantial changes in 
investor perceptions about real estate markets over this longer interval.  The 
data clearly indicate that most institutional investors are less sanguine about 
real estate markets now than they were in the 1980s.  Not surprisingly, U.S. 
institutional investors show by far the greatest relative downward change in 
perceptions over time.  One explanation for this has to do with the real estate 
losses U.S. institutional investors incurred over this time period.  Most U.S. 
institutional investors had terribly negative experiences from buying 
commercial real estate directly in the 1980s.  This situation arose because the 
U.S. had such weak levels of real activity during this time period and such a 
huge surplus of space built in the 1980s.  This affected the net incomes of 
even the best debt-free properties.  Another factor contributing to the under-
performance of real estate in the U.S. was the plunge in interest rates and 
inflation rates since the 1981-82 period.  This trend generally leads to lower 
overall realty returns and higher stock market returns, which is a common 
theme in the real estate literature.
6  
 
The evidence in Table 2 indicates that institutional investors in U.K. went 
from being overly optimistic about their local real estate markets in 1987-91 to 
being pessimistic about real estate investments in the period 1992-96.  It is 
plausible that the vast amount of overbuilding that occurred in the late 1980s 
following Prime Minister Thatcher's relaxation of capital controls is partly to 
blame for this.  Alternatively, it may simply reflect low inflation and low 
interest rates, and the fact that, with a decrease in the rate of inflation, real 
estate investments are a much less attractive investment vehicle relative to 
stocks and bonds.  This is another point to which we shall return.  
 
With respect to the institutional investors in the 7 countries of Continental 
Europe, all but France and Italy are less sanguine about their local real estate 
                                                                 
6 For studies along these lines, see Fama and Schwert (1977), Chan, Hendershott, and 
Sanders (1990), Gyourko and Linneman (1988), Goetzman and Ibbotson (1990), 
Newell (1996), Hoesli, MacGregor, Matysiak, and Nanthakumaran (1996), and 
Barkham, Ward, and Henry (1996). 
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markets now than they were in 1986-91.  In France, expected returns on real 
estate increased from 15.96% in 1987-91 to 18.81% in 1992-96, while expected 
excess returns (over the risk-free rate) unambiguously increased.  In Italy, 
expected returns on real estate fell from 17.75% in 1987-91 to 14.52% in 1992-
96.  At the same time, however, expected excess returns on real estate in Italy 
(over the risk-free rate) rose from 13.33% in 1987-91 to 24.73% in 1992-96. 
 
In the 1980s, Australia experienced a rate of inflation of 7.9%, but in the 1990s, 
inflation declined to 2.2%.  At the same time realty returns underperformed 
stocks in the period 1986-89, and again in the period 1990-94.  Since 1994, 
however, realty returns have outperformed stocks.  This helps to explain why 
investment in real estate is a recent phenomenon in Australia, but does not 
explain why Australian institutional investors are less sanguine about their 
local real estate markets now than they were in 1986-91.  
 
Before moving on, several caveats would appear to be in order.  First of all, 
the procedure we followed in calculating E t(R
*
t+1) - R t
f is, inevitably, open to 
question at a number of specific points.  The sample of 10 countries over the 
period 1986-96 is admittedly very small and, in some respects, 
unrepresentative.  Furthermore, while we have attempted to make very skillful 
and exhaustive use of the data, one wonders whether the sample is strong 
enough to support the weight it has to carry.  For example, several of the 
actual portfolio weights for countries of Continental Europe may or may not 
be representative, so that a good deal of play remains in our estimates of the 
expected returns that would induce institutional investors in each of these 
countries to hold more real estate in their portfolios.  These are points, 
needless to say, that we are fully aware.  Having said that, these sample 
limitations do not take away from the main endeavor of the study, as we see 
it, to explain the behavior of some of the larger institutional investors in 
countries like France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
Fortunately, in the present case the paucity of data stops at institutional 
investors in these countries.  On this basis, perhaps we should place greater 
emphasis on the results in these countries, and delete all of the remaining 
countries.  But still we might miss some general and perhaps quite plausible 
hypothesis affecting institutional investors in other countries. 
Another potentially important bias in these results stems from the use of 
property-stock sector returns to calculate S.  Virtually all existing studies of 
appraisal-based real estate returns show that property-stock sector returns 
are far more correlated with the stock market than with appraisal-based 
property return series (see, e.g., Hartzell and Mengden (1986), and Ross and 
Zisler (1987)).
7   To determine how sensitive the results are to these different 
                                                                 
 7 In addition to huge differences in price volatility between stocks and bonds, with 
their daily market quotations, and the infrequently appraised values of real estate that 30  Chun and Shilling 
covariances, subsequent analyses were replicated for the U.S. and the U.K. 
using appraisal-based real estate returns.  The U.S. data were obtained from 
NCREIF (National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries), while the 
U.K. data were obtained from Weatherall Green & Smith.  Both indices consist 
of direct real estate equity investments actually made by major institutional 
investors.  The conclusions were virtually unchanged. 
 
To test further the robustness of our results, we performed the same analysis 
on historical portfolio weights but with a common covariance matrix for all 
countries of Continental Europe except Belgium and Italy.  Evidence provided 
by Eichholtz, Huisman, Koedijk, and Schuin (1996) suggests that returns in 
most European countries, except for Belgium and Italy, are significantly 
correlated with the returns of the European continent as a whole.  
 
This would suggest that E t(R
*
t+1)  - R t
f for these countries would be better 
measured using a common covariance matrix.
8   We found that our results are 
quite robust to different specifications of a common covariance matrix.   
A final caveat pertains to our choice of ?.  In the above calculations, we had 
set the value of  ? = 3.  To test the importance of this parameter, (1) was 
reestimated using ? = 2 (see Giovannini and Jorion (1989) for more details).  
The qualitative results were unchanged. 
 
To summarize, the patterns in Table 2 seem to be, in fact, remarkably regular.  
Institutional investors in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States currently are all quite pessimistic about their local real estate markets, 
while institutional investors in France and Italy, for example, appear to be 
quite optimistic.  Also, at the same time most institutional investors are less 
sanguine about real estate markets than they were in the 1980s.  Along with 
current stock market fundamentals, this has caused most institutional 
investors to back away from holding real estate investments, thereby 
decreasing relative portfolio shares in commercial real estate to levels 
corresponding to the low end of allocation ranges. 
                                                                                                                                           
make up an appraisal-based property return index, there is the problem of adjusting 
appraisal-based property returns for illiquidity and transaction costs, which suggests 
resorting to property-stock sector returns. 
 
8 Compare with Goetzmann and Wachter (1996).  Goetzmann and Wachter offer a 
substantially different treatment, in which they use cluster analysis to construct 
groups of countries based on the comovements in their real estate returns.  Their 
findings suggest that Australia, Sweden, Hong Kong and Taiwan are all relatively 
unambiguous in their relationships with other countries.  They also could not reject 
the hypothesis that Sweden, Belgium, France, and several other countries cluster the 
United Kingdom. Real Estate Asset Allocation  31 
 
3.2  Campbell Approximate Present-Value Model 
 
The Campbell (1987, 1991) approximate loglinear present-value model holds 
that current unexpected excess returns on an asset can be decomposed into 
the following accounting relationship: 
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where dt+1 is the log of the real dividend (cash flow) paid to investors during 
period t+1, r t+1 is the real interest rate for the time period t+1, e t+1 is the 
continuously compounded excess (over the risk-free rate) return on the asset, 
? denotes a one-period backward difference operator, and (Et+1  - E t) 
represents a revision of expectations given any new information arriving at 
time t+1.  The discount rate parameter ? is a number slightly less than 1 (i.e., ? 
is constrained to be 0.9962).  Equation (2) says that when the unexpected 
excess return on an asset is positive, then either the expected future growth in 
the asset's cash flows must be increasing, expected future real estate interest 
rates must be decreasing, or expected future excess returns on the asset must 
be decreasing or some combination of these three effects must occur 
simultaneously. 
 
Equation (2) implies 
 
ve,t+1 = ed,t+1 -  er,t+1 -  ee,t+1          (3) 
 
where v e,t+1  is the unexpected component of the asset return e t+1,  ed,t+1  
represents innovations in (or news about) cash flows,  er,t+1  represents 
innovations in future real interest rates, and ee,t+1 represents innovations in 
future excess returns.   
 
To estimate ed,t+1 , er,t+1,  and  ee,t+1, we model excess returns to real estate, the 
real interest rate, the one-month risk-free rate relative to its past 12-month 
moving average (the relative bill rate), the dividend yield, and excess returns 
to the value-weighted market portfolio, according to a first-order VAR model.  
We can write the VAR model in matrix notation as 
 
zt+1 = Azt + wt+1               (4) 32  Chun and Shilling 
 
where zt+1  is a 5x1 vector, the first element of which is excess returns et+1 on 
real estate, and the second element of which is the real interest rate, wt+1 is an 
error term, and A is a 5x5 matrix of coefficients to be estimated. 
From (4), we obtain 
 
) 5 ( ) ( ) ( 1
1
2 1 , 1
1
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where  1 a¢ is a 5x1 vector whose elements are all equal to 0 except the first 
element, which is equal to 1, and  2 a¢  is similarly defined except that its second 
element is equal to 1. 
 
From (3) and (5), given that the first element of 
1 + t w is  , 1 1 1 , + + ¢ = t t e w a v we 
then obtain   
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Having done that, it is possible to use ve,t+1 and  ee,t+1 to study the relationship 
between unexpected excess returns on real estate today and expected excess 
returns in the future.  We can also use ve,t+1  to determine what has driven the 
switch from real estate to stocks and bonds in each of the countries examined 
above.   
 
In all countries except for Australia, the model in (4) is estimated using 
monthly returns.  For Australia, the model is estimated using quarterly data.  
The data sources are the same as described above.  All values are expressed 
in local currency.   
 
Table 3 provides the results of estimating (4).  We highlight two features of 
the results.  First, for the majority of the countries there is a relatively high 
degree of predictability in the monthly excess real estate returns.  For example, 
in the United States approximately 14% of the variation in monthly excess 
returns on real estate is accounted for by the five forecasting variables.  
Similar or higher degrees of predictability are exhibited in Austria, the 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Sweden and the United Kingdom, approximately 6 to 9% of the variation in 
monthly excess returns on real estate is accounted for by the five forecasting 
variables.  The lowest degrees of predictability are exhibited in Italy and 
France.  Second, the predictability in Table 3 is consistent with studies by 
Campbell (1987), Fama and French (1988), and others.  For example, Campbell 34  Chun and Shilling 
(1987) finds that approximately 11% of the variation in monthly excess returns 
on stocks is predicted by a set of similar variables.  Fama and French (1988), 
using a slightly different set of variables, report an unadjusted R
2 of 4%.  
Ferson (1989) reports an average unadjusted R
2 of approximately 5% for real 
estate. 
 
The expected excess returns on real estate themselves vary significantly over 
time.  This is illustrated in Figures 2a-2d.  These figures plot the expected 
excess return (risk premiums) in Australia, Continental Europe, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. These values are calculated using the 
estimated regression coefficients in Table 3.  The values in Figures 2a, 2b, and 
2d are measured in percentage points per month whereas the values in Figure 
2c are in percentage points per quarter.   
 
As can be seen, expected risk premiums are the most volatile in Australia 
followed by expected risk premiums in the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and Continental Europe respectively.  The peak forecastable risk premium in 
the United States is approximately 3.81%.  In contrast, the lowest forecastable 
risk premium in the United States is -3.12%.  The series seems to peak just 
before or after a business trough, and tends to bottom out as the economy 
recovers.  This result is consistent with Mei and Saunders (1997).   
 
If we compare the forecastable risk premiums in the United States with the 
forecastable risk premiums in the United Kingdom, we find a correlation 
coefficient of 0.1856.  Similarly, the correlations with the forecastable excess 
returns in the United States and Continental Europe, and in the United States 
and Australia are 0.2639 and 0.3098 respectively.  The correlations with the 
expected excess returns in the United Kingdom and Continental Europe, and 
in the United Kingdom and Australia are 0.3897 and -0.2933 respectively.  
Lastly, the correlation with the expected excess returns in Continental Europe 
and Australia is -0.3023.  These results are easy to explain within the context 
of Eichholtz, Huisman, Koedijk, and Schuin's (1996) finding that there are 
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We next present a variance decomposition for real estate returns in our 10 
countries (see rows 1 -10 of Table 4).  These values are normalized by the 
variance of the return innovation itself so the numbers reported are shares 
that add up to one. 
 
The decompositions suggest that the cash flow innovations ed,t+1 account for 
a large portion of the return variation in real estate portfolios in most 
countries followed by innovations in future expected returns ee,t+1 .  To 
illustrate this, consider the case of the United States.  Here the variance 
decomposition attributes 213% of the variance of real  estate returns to news 
about future cash flows, and 202% to the news about future excess returns. 
 
We can also see that there is a large negative correlation between 
innovations in future cash flows and news about future excess returns.  The 
remainder of the variation in real estate excess returns is explained by the 
variation in the real interest rate and the three covariance terms  - 
COV(ed,t+1,er,t+1), COV(ed,t+1, ee,t+1), and COV(er,t+1  , ee,t+1).  The decompositions 
for Australia, Italy, Spain, and Sweden are fairly similar to that of the United 
States; both the variance of news about future cash flows and future 
expected returns are quite large, while news about real interest rates er,t+1 is 
relatively small. 
 
In contrast, the decompositions for Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom 
suggest that a large portion of the return variation in real estate portfolios is 
attributable to news about real interest rates.  Then there is Austria.  Here the 
variance decomposition literally and figuratively "blows up" owing to the low 
apparent variance of the return innovation in Austria.  Even so, if forced to 
categorize Austria we would categorize it more like Belgium, France, and the 
Netherlands than like Australia, Italy, Spain, Sweden, or the United States, 
since both the variance of news about future cash flows and real interest 
rates are more important than the variance of news about future expected 
excess returns.   
 
The last column of Table 4 reports the correlation between unexpected excess 
returns  ve,t+1 and innovations in future expected excess returns ee,t+1.  The 
correlations are negative for all countries but Austria and France.  This 
negative correlation implies that unexpectedly large excess returns today are 
associated with smaller future excess returns, holding all else constant.  This 
in turn implies that the optimal investment strategy for a risk-neutral investor 
is to invest immediately after an unexpected drop in et+1 - Etet+1, since this price 
drop is consistent with an upward adjustment in future expected rates of 
return. 
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Table 4 : Variance Decomposition for Excess Real Estate Returns 














U.S.  2.136  0.830  2.023  -1.306  -2.589  -0.060  -
0.482 
U. K.  2.122  1.904  0.606  -3.751  -0.938  1.09  -
0.875 
Sweden  1.333  0.651  1.209  -1.560  -1.748  1.13  -
0.817 
Austria  16596  19768  142.33  -35313  2912.4  -3190  0.085 
Netherlands  6.452  6.256  0.868  -11.271  1.812  -3.01  -
0.284 
Italy  1.491  0.806  0.899  -1.542  0.305  -0.940  -
0.610 
France  2.322  0.326  0.165  -1.346  -0.813  0.361  0.154 
Spain  1.773  0.854  1.435  -0.961  -1.110  -0.964  -
0.324 
Belgium  2.475  0.835  0.308  -2.186  -1.040  0.630  -
0.183 
Australia  0.665  0.160  0.249  -0.343  0.234  0.034  -
0.776 
Average  2.307  1.402  0.862  -2.696  -0.654  -0.192  -
0.466 
Note : Austria is excluded in calculating the average. 
 
The evidence in Table 4 is consistent with the idea of mean reversion.  Most 
assets display a negative correlation between unexpected excess returns ve,t+1 
and innovations in future expected excess returns ee,t+1 because when ve,t+1  
falls the market may get inappropriately pessimistic about current or future 
earnings.  Or it may reflect the dynamics of some common macroeconomic 
driving variables (see Fama and French (1986)).  Fama and French (1988) 
suggest that there is considerable mean reversion in the return on a stock 
market index for horizons from 18 months to 5 years.  Poterba and Summers 
(1986) also find considerable evidence of negative serial correlation at long 
horizons for most countries, the only exceptions being Finland, South Africa, 
and Spain.  From the international evidence, Poterba and Summers conclude 
that mean reversion is more pronounced in less broad-based and less 
sophisticated foreign equity markets.  There is also evidence in Mei and 
Saunders (1997) of mean reversion in real estate excess returns in the United 
States for holding periods greater than 1 year. 
 
4.  Hypothesis Tests 
   
Let us now set down a simple portfolio model to test if institutional investors 38  Chun and Shilling 
shift out of real estate assets into stocks in response to a bull market in 
stocks.  The alternative hypothesis is that institutional investors switch some 
portion of their funds from real estate into financial assets as they become 
pessimistic about their local real estate markets. 
 
We proceed as follows.  We let w
^ 
t be the proportion of total assets held in real estate in a given base period 
(we use 1986), adjusted for the cumulative change in the value of the 
institutional investor's stock portfolio over time.  We then let q t = w t/w
^ 
t, which is the actual portfolio weight in real estate divided by the adjusted 
portfolio weight.  The resulting portfolio quotient should depend largely on 
the expected excess return on real estate. We then estimate the following 
regression equation: 
 
qt  = b0 + b1[E t-1(Rt
*
 ) – Rt-1] + mt.          (7) 
 
If institutional investors decrease their investments in real estate when they 
are pessimistic and increase their investments in real estate when they are 
optimistic, one would expect to find a positive and significant relation 
between qt and Et-1(R
*
t) - Rt-1. 
 
Alternatively, the qt of a typical institutional investor may vary not because 
of decreased returns on real estate, but because of the lure of higher returns 
on other assets.  Obviously, if the pulling power of, say, a bull stock market is 
more important than the push of low returns on real estate assets, then we 
would expect the relation between qt and actual values of real estate returns 
to be weak. 
 
It is reasonable to expect a substantial lag in the adjustment of qt to changes 
in Et (R
 
t+1) - Rt.  This is because a decrease in the economic attractiveness of 
real estate must be perceived by the institution, a decision must be made 
regarding which assets to sell or which property markets to get out of, and 
the properties must actually be sold.  The first two lags might be short for 
some institutions, but the full response to a significant decline in the expected 
returns on real estate is undoubtedly not completed for a number of years. 
 
The reader will note that the inclusion of E t-1(R
*
t) - Rt-1 on the right-hand side 
of (7) results in an expression that is somewhat circular, since we first used 
actual values of w t to solve for E t-1(R
*
t)  - R
f
t-1.  To see what is precisely 




t-1.  The result can then be 
substituted into (7).  This yields  
 
) 8 ( )] ( [ 1 1 13 1 , 3 12 1 , 2
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f
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where Zi,t-1 = ?t-1wi, t-1, s ij is the covariance of asset i with asset j and ?t-1 is a 
constant.  Written in this way, it becomes clear that E t-1(R
*
t) - Rt-1 represents 
the effect that real estate is expected to have on an institutional investor's 
portfolio (which appropriately involves w i,t-1 and s ij).  Note that the effect 




In a more straightforward test of the factors driving institutional investors' 
real estate investment decisions, we also regress q t on lagged real estate 
unexpected excess returns.  That is to say, we estimate the equation:  
 
qt = ß0 + ß1ve,t-1 + µt.                               (9) 
 
The model in (9) avoids some of the problems inherent in (7), and follows 
directly from the work of Mei and Saunders (1997) and others. 
 
Table 5 provides the coefficient estimates for both regression equations.  The 
top panel of Table 5 reports the regression results for equation (7).  There are 
some notable patterns.  Specifically, the evidence with respect to (7) shows 
that the relation between real estate portfolio weights and lagged values of 
our expected return differentials on real estate is positive and statistically 
significant.  These results confirm that optimistic expectations have a positive 
effect on institutional investors' demands for real estate assets.  Yet the 
proportion of the total variance explained in the dependent variable is only 
9.8% (see whole sample).  Note that when the model is estimated over the 
1986-91 subperiod, the proportion of total variance explained increases to 
39.8%.  In the 1992-96 subperiod, the statistical significance of the model 
drops to 9.6%.  
 
A brief interpretation of the results so far, then goes as follows.  As 
institutional investors become more pessimistic about their local real estate 
markets, they would appear to make active portfolio shifts out of real estate 
into financial assets.  But these shifts are relatively small.  A larger proportion 
of the total portfolio shift from real estate into financial assets over the whole 
sample period 1986-96 can be explained by the relative increase in stock 
market capitalization.   
 
In considering these results, it should be remarked that real estate 
diversification of a portfolio typically entails agency risks and costs, and that 
real estate is a different type of asset than stocks and bonds.  Consequently, 
simplistic arguments about geographical and/or property-type diversification, 
as those given above, may not be totally applicable.   
 
There also is a liquidity argument that may help explain a portion of the shift 40  Chun and Shilling 
between real estate and financial assets.  This argument suggests that 
illiquidity can cause investors to act in a more risk averse manner with regard 
to their holdings of risky assets.
9  This argument works in several ways.  
Applied to the case of Australia, for example, where the realty market is fairly 
illiquid in terms of global standards, this argument helps explain why 
institutional investors in that country hold a much smaller fraction of their 
assets in real estate than, say, institutional investors in Britain.  Applied to 
the case of the U.S., on the other hand, where a big change between 
traditional ownership and REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) ownership has 
been taking place, this argument could help explain the declining portfolio 
share allocated to privately-held real estate.   
 
To determine exactly how much of the declining portfolio share is attributable 
to a shift from privately-held real estate into publicly-held REIT shares, one 
would n eed data regarding institutional holdings of publicly-traded REIT 
shares.  Unfortunately, we cannot adequately test this with available data, but 
we believe such an investigation would help to explain why institutional 
investors, at least in the U.S., hold less traditional real estate investments 
today (as a percent of total assets) than in 1986.  
 
Let us now turn to the estimation results of equation (9).  These results are 
presented in the bottom panel of Table 5.  Two aspects of the results stand 
out.  F irst, the results generally suggest that qt varies inversely with ve,t-1.  
This result is not inconsistent with the previous literature.  The main result in 
the literature is that institutional investors' real estate investment decisions, at 
least in the United States, appear to be negatively related to lagged real estate 
unexpected excess returns (see Mei and Saunders (1997)). 
 
Second, and perhaps more important, the goodness of fit (R
2) for the portfolio 
share equation is approximately 9.0% (see whole sample period).  We interpret 
this to mean that while institutional investors are apt to raise (lower) qt after a 
decrease (increase) in ve,t-1, only a small proportion of the variation in qt is 
actually explained by the relative increase or decrease in ve,t-1.  We judge this 
percent to be extremely low, and therefore conclude that most of the change 
in qt can be explained by the marked change in the value of the institutional 
investor's stock portfolio over time and not by a change in ve,t-1,. 
 
The major caveat about these results is that they are dependent on a 
particular specification of the z t+1s in (4).  Fortunately, the results do not 
appear to be very sensitive to specification of the z t+1s.  Nor do the results 
appear to be very sensitive to the number of lags we include in our VAR 
                                                                 
9See, for example, Grossman and Laroque (1990). 
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system.  We should also note that there is some evidence that dividend 
yields and short and long-term interest rates have a modest degree of 
forecasting power for excess stock returns.  The forecastability of stock 
returns also seems to increase with the time interval over which returns are 
measured.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The evidence on the investment behavior of institutional investors presented 
here raises an interesting question.  Why has the institutional ownership of 
real estate in most countries been declining as a percent of total assets?  To 
address this issue, a model of ex ante real estate expected returns was first 
formulated.  The model allows us to compute the expected real estate returns 
needed to justify why institutional investors have historically tended to 
underweight real estate in their portfolios, and why most institutional 
investors as of late have shifted out of whatever real estate assets they do 
own and into financial assets.  The model produces estimates that are 
plausible, and quite robust with respect to alternative specifications. 
 
We then use these estimated ex ante real estate expected returns to analyze 
the relation between relative net yields and portfolio shares.  Here we find 
that investor pessimism plays a relatively modest role in explaining why most 
institutional investors have been shifting their funds from real estate assets 
to financial assets.  The results instead suggest that portfolio allocations to 
real estate have fallen to the bottom of benchmark ranges for most 
institutional investors worldwide because of the relative shift in stock market 
capitalization that has taken place over the last decade.   
 
In this paper we also used Campbell's (1987, 1991) approximate log-linear 
present-value model to characterize the dynamic relationship between real 
estate excess returns in the current period and expected real estate excess 
returns in the future.  Here we find a modest degree of forecasting power for 
real estate returns, and evidence of a strong negative correlation between 
unexpected excess returns today and innovations in future expected excess 
returns.  We also find a negative relation between institutional investors' 
portfolio allocations to real estate and lagged real estate unexpected excess 
returns.  This negative relationship suggests that most institutional investors 
behave rationally. 
 
With regard to our ability to explain what drives institutional investors' real 
estate portfolio decisions, we note that only a small proportion of what is 
driving institutional investors' real estate portfolio decisions is actually 
explained by lagged unexpected excess returns.  Too small in fact to conclude 42  Chun and Shilling 
that institutional investors have been switching their funds from real estate 
into financial assets primarily because they are much more pessimistic about 
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